I cannot attend today's 50th Anniversary Celebration of Richard Walton and Robert McKersie’s seminal 1965 book, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. But a conversation last week with Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld prompted me to start thinking about its impact on me. In my final year as an economics Ph.D. student at Princeton
in the early 1990s, I was lucky that Craig Olson—then a Professor of Industrial
Relations at the University of Wisconsin, now at the University of
Illinois—spent a year there as a visiting professor. I had little knowledge of
the then-mysterious field of industrial relations, but as a leading scholar in
that field, Craig kindly introduced me to the key works in the field. I can’t
remember everything he recommended, but I certainly remember that A Behavioral Theory
of Labor Negotiations was high on the list.
This soon made an impact on my thinking. On a specific
level, Walton and McKersie’s insights on intraorganizational
bargaining—developed not only in A
Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, but also elsewhere—were important
for my dissertation. I was analyzing UAW pattern bargaining. The standard
economic explanations for pattern bargaining are, unsurprisingly, market-based:
wage patterns as 1) taking wages out of competition, or 2) as “rough-and-ready
guides whereby the working of supply and demand is anticipated,” as John R. Hicks
put it in his 1932 A Theory of Wages
(p. 80). But even as a budding economist, no pun intended, I was skeptical
about these economic-based explanations. Indeed, archival evidence of union
memos and records pointed, in my mind, to internal union political
considerations, not market forces. I was familiar with Ashenfelter and Johnson’s model of strikes that was rooted in internal union dynamics (of course,
since we would routinely have lunch meetings in Ashenfelter’s large Princeton
office, in the shadow of a large portrait of another Hicks: Clarence J. of
Standard Oil fame). And I was familiar with the famous Ross-Dunlop debate in
which Arthur Ross championed the political side of union wage determination.
But Walton and McKersie’s framework provided a much stronger foundation for
understanding the role of internal union political dynamics in the context of
the entire negotiations process.
On a deeper level, A Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiations made a more lasting impact on my thinking in
at least two ways. One, though economists at Princeton and a few other places study
labor unions with some eye toward institutional realities, the general approach
in economics is not to give a lot of attention to how things really work within
and across organizations. A Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiations opened up this space to me through its classic
development of the four subprocesses of negotiations. Through these
subprocesses, I could now start to understand how labor and management
negotiators actually interacted, and how decisions were made. This helped me recognize
the importance of real-world institutions in understanding the employment
relationship. And the need to do so in a rich, multidisciplinary way. These
are, of course, two hallmarks of industrial relations scholarship.
Two, A Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiations introduced me to mixed motive conflict; and as
such, to another fundamental principle of industrial relations scholarship—that
the employment relationship is best characterized as a mixed-motive bargaining
relationship, something I would end up writing about multiple times
(eventually). In these ways, then, A
Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations helped me grow from a young
economist into an industrial relations scholar with a deeper, multidisciplinary
understanding of institutions and the employment relationship.
Like too many others to count, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations has also shaped my teaching.
And hopefully in some modest way I am helping to continue its influence on
future generations. In particular, Walton and McKersie’s four subprocesses form
the core of the negotiations material in the bargaining chapter of my textbook,
Labor Relations: Striking a Balance
(McGraw-Hill). Call me old-fashioned, but I’ve even retained their original
terms and have explicit subsections devoted to each one. Nowhere else in my
textbook does one piece of work receive such extended discussion. And other key
insights on labor negotiations and labor-management relationships are a
byproduct of their seminal work, especially Walton and McKersie’s book with
Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Strategic
Negotiations: A Theory of Change in Labor-Management Relations (Harvard
Business School Press), and Raymond Friedman’s Front Stage, Backstage: The Dramatic Structure of Labor Negotiations
(MIT Press).
For me personally, then, Walton and McKersie’s work has been
influential in significant ways that might not be readily apparent beyond my
textbook. But more broadly speaking, the true testament to the enduring
importance of A Behavioral Theory of
Labor Negotiations is that its insights and the follow-up work it has
spawned are still so useful 50 years later, not only for academics seeking to
understand labor relations (or negotiations more generally), but also for
practitioners who negotiate and manage relationships in diverse organizations.
No comments:
Post a Comment